Beating Singer at His Own Game

Peter Singer is one of very few living philosophers who are known in the mainstream--I have seen him on the Morning Show, the Colbert Report, and a BBC news special.
Its probably a toss-up whether he is more known for his animal rights stuff or his ending world poverty stuff, but he is extremely prominent in both areas.
Recently, Singer has published a book entitled "The Life You Can Save". This book is written for a popular audience, and it basically makes the same case Singer has been making since his 1972 "Famine, Affluence, and Morality": that we (individuals as well as governments) should be giving A LOT more money to charities, to end world poverty and unnecessary deaths from things that, frankly, people shouldn't die from-- diarrhea, cholera, etc. etc. Even the poor in affluent countries like the U.S. are much better off than the poor in third-world countries, and proximity should have no independent effect on our obligations.
I generally agree with Singer's project, as well as most of his others (that is, I am a utilitarian who isn't afraid to follow those principles to their conclusion.)

Here, I want to focus on one of his most famous arguments. This is an argument that gets discussed in Intro to Ethics courses all over. Briefly, it is this:

"if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing...the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away. Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position." (Famine, Affluence, and Morality)

Its the example of the child drowning that gets me. I actually think it is an apt analogy--if you can save a child's life by donating $75 to Oxfam, that is just as good as saving a child's life that is drowning in a wading pool right in front of you. That's okay with me. Sure, you might ruin your suit. But saving a child's life is much more valuable than a suit, even a nice one.

But there is an issue here, if we are sticking strictly to our utilitarian calculus (which Singer wants to do). Let's assume, for sake of example, that a child in Africa's minor ailment can be cured with a $75 donation to Oxfam, allowing him to live a productive and full life. Next, let's assume that the suit I am wearing has a resale value of, say, $300. I notice the child drowning in front of me. Here we are, in the same situation which Singer gives above, but with the added detail about the suit's cost. So, it seems we should save the child in front of us--most people would even say its pretty obvious we ought to do that. But let's say I don't have time to take off my suit. If this is so, then, by utilitarian lights, I ought not save the child! Why? Because I can save the lives of 4 children by leaving, selling the suit, and donating the money to Oxfam. The lives of 4 are greater than the life of one, and proximity makes no difference.
This looks to be just another formulation of the trolley problem, or the forced organ-donor example. But it is especially interesting because what Singer says in his work on poverty seems to imply he has to be ok with this counterintuitive conclusion.
Anyone have any way of getting out of this? It sure seems like there ought to be one; that is, I think Singer's argument is cogent--so something fishy must be going on here.